Hope Winter Break is going well for all of you! If you're bored, take a look at this Washington Post article:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/27/2012-the-year-in-graphs/?hpid=z1
Many of the policy discussions going on in DC right now should/could be informed by this data.
HAPPY NEW YEAR! :)
Mr. Jones
Thursday, December 27, 2012
Tuesday, December 18, 2012
HW for 12/18
The Final Countdown... T-minus 3 school days to the Holiday Break...
You might want to flip through your new textbook to help you - the index will be particular helpful - or just use the Internet.
Define:
1. elastic/necessary and proper clause
2. commerce clause
3. supremacy clause
4. reserved powers
5. enumerated powers
6. implied powers
7. bicameral legislature
8. judicial review
Now, take a look at the Bill of Rights (first 10 amendments to the Constitution) and write a sentence for each amendment summarizing what it means in your own words.
That's it for now! See you guys on Thursday.
You might want to flip through your new textbook to help you - the index will be particular helpful - or just use the Internet.
Define:
1. elastic/necessary and proper clause
2. commerce clause
3. supremacy clause
4. reserved powers
5. enumerated powers
6. implied powers
7. bicameral legislature
8. judicial review
Now, take a look at the Bill of Rights (first 10 amendments to the Constitution) and write a sentence for each amendment summarizing what it means in your own words.
That's it for now! See you guys on Thursday.
Monday, December 10, 2012
Readings for HW Assignment - Federalist Organizer
Okay guys, here are the readings for the organizer. Remember - please, please, please just skim. We will discuss next class before the quiz. Thanks! Mr. Jones :)
The
Federalist No. 47
The
Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among
Its Different Parts
New
York Packet
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point.
The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn.
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote.
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department.
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor." Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.
If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by declaring "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the nature of a free government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity and amity." Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the head of the executive department, is the presiding member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vote in case of a tie. The executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the legislative department, and his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive department.
The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares "that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them." This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nature an executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves.
I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention.
The constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the executive magistrate, a partial control over the legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like control to the judiciary department; and even blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its council of appointment members of the legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary. And its court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal members of the judiciary department.
The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of the preceding. The governor, who is the executive magistrate, is appointed by the legislature; is chancellor and ordinary, or surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and president, with a casting vote, of one of the legislative branches. The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of the governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the judiciary department are appointed by the legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other.
According to the constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is the head of the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an executive council, he appoints the members of the judiciary department, and forms a court of impeachment for trial of all officers, judiciary as well as executive. The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the legislature; and the executive power of pardoning in certain cases, to be referred to the same department. The members of the executive counoil are made EX-OFFICIO justices of peace throughout the State.
In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the legislative department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are vice-presidents in the executive department. The executive chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the legislative branches constitutes the Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative department in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States, it appears that the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices of the peace; in this State, the members of one branch of it are EX-OFFICIO justices of the peace; as are also the members of the executive council. The principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All officers may be removed on address of the legislature.
Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, makes the executive magistrate appointable by the legislative department; and the members of the judiciary by the executive department.
The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her constitution declares, "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that the justices of county courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly." Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the irferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the legislature; and that all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. The executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the legislative department.
The constitution of North Carolina, which declares "that the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, to the legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the judiciary department.
In South Carolina, the constitution makes the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative department. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judiciary department, including even justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.
In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other," we find that the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature; and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the legislature.
In citing these cases, in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the sacred maxim of free government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper.
PUBLIUS
Publius (James Madison)
February 1, 1788
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated As To Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
The
Federalist No. 51
The
Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between
the Different Departments
Independent
Journal
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.
PUBLIUS
The
Federalist No. 47
The
Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among
Its Different Parts
New
York Packet
Wednesday, January 30, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point.
The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn.
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote.
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department.
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor." Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.
If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by declaring "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the nature of a free government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity and amity." Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the head of the executive department, is the presiding member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vote in case of a tie. The executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the legislative department, and his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive department.
The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares "that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them." This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nature an executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves.
I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention.
The constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the executive magistrate, a partial control over the legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like control to the judiciary department; and even blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its council of appointment members of the legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary. And its court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal members of the judiciary department.
The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of the preceding. The governor, who is the executive magistrate, is appointed by the legislature; is chancellor and ordinary, or surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and president, with a casting vote, of one of the legislative branches. The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of the governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the judiciary department are appointed by the legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other.
According to the constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is the head of the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an executive council, he appoints the members of the judiciary department, and forms a court of impeachment for trial of all officers, judiciary as well as executive. The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the legislature; and the executive power of pardoning in certain cases, to be referred to the same department. The members of the executive counoil are made EX-OFFICIO justices of peace throughout the State.
In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the legislative department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are vice-presidents in the executive department. The executive chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the legislative branches constitutes the Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative department in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States, it appears that the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices of the peace; in this State, the members of one branch of it are EX-OFFICIO justices of the peace; as are also the members of the executive council. The principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All officers may be removed on address of the legislature.
Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, makes the executive magistrate appointable by the legislative department; and the members of the judiciary by the executive department.
The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her constitution declares, "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that the justices of county courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly." Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the irferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the legislature; and that all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. The executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the legislative department.
The constitution of North Carolina, which declares "that the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, to the legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the judiciary department.
In South Carolina, the constitution makes the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative department. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judiciary department, including even justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.
In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other," we find that the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature; and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the legislature.
In citing these cases, in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the sacred maxim of free government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper.
PUBLIUS
Federalist
No. 48
Publius (James Madison)
February 1, 1788
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated As To Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
IT was shown in the last paper that
the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each
other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these
departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional
control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as
essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
It is agreed on all sides that the
powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly
and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally
evident that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an
overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective
powers. It will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and that it
ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.
After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as
they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and
most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the
invasion of the others. What this security ought to be is the great problem to
be solved.
Will it be sufficient to mark, with
precision, the boundaries of these departments in the constitution of the
government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching
spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally
relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. But
experience assures us that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly
overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for
the more feeble against the more powerful members of the government. The
legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
The founders of our republics have
so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed that no task can be less
pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect
for truth, however, obliges us to remark that they seem never for a moment to
have turned their eyes from the danger, to liberty, from the overgrown and
all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified
by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have
recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all
power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by
executive usurpations.
In a government where numerous and
extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of a hereditary monarch, the
executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and
watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a
democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative
functions and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular
deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their
executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable
emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic
where the executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and the
duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly,
which is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid
confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the
passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of
pursuing the objects of its passions by means which reason prescribes; it is
against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to
indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.
The legislative department derives a
superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional
powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it
can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures,
the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not
infrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies whether the
operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the
legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained
within a narrower compass and being more simple in its nature, and the
judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of
usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat
themselves. Nor is this all: as the legislative department alone has access to
the pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and
in all a prevailing influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the
other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives
still greater facility to encroachments of the former.
I have appealed to our own
experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary
to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied
without end. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and
archives of every State in the Union. But as a more concise and at the same
time equally satisfactory evidence, I will refer to the example of two States,
attested by two unexceptionable authorities.
The first example is that of
Virginia, a State which, as we have seen, has expressly declared in its
constitution that the three great departments ought not to be intermixed. The
authority in support of it is Mr. Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages
for remarking the operation of the government, was himself the chief magistrate
of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had
impressed him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of some
length from his very interesting Notes on the State of Virginia, p. 195.
"All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is
precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that
these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single
one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as
one. Let those who doubt it turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As
little will it avail us that they are chosen by ourselves. An elective
despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which should not
only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government
should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy as that no
one could transcend their legal limits without being effectually checked and
restrained by the others. For this reason that convention which passed the
ordinance of government laid its foundation on this basis, that the
legislative, executive and judiciary departments should be separate and
distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them
at the same time. But no barrier was provided between these several powers.
The judiciary and executive members were left dependent on the legislative for
their subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If,
therefore, the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no
opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can be effectual; because in
that case they may put their proceeding into the form of an act of Assembly,
which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They have accordingly in
many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary
controversy, and the direction of the executive, during the whole time
of their session, is becoming habitual and familiar."
The other State which I shall take
for an example is Pennsylvania; and the other authority, the Council of
Censors, which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this
body, as marked out by the Constitution, was "to inquire whether the
Constitution had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether the
legislative and executive branches of government had performed their duty as
guardians of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or
greater powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution." In the
execution of this trust, the council were necessarily led to a comparison of
both the legislative and executive proceedings with the constitutional powers
of these departments; and from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most
of which both sides in the council subscribed, it appears that the Constitution
had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a variety of important
instances.
A great number of laws had been
passed violating, without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all
bills of a public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration of
the people; although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the
Constitution against improper acts of the legislature.
The constitutional trial by jury had
been violated and powers assumed which had not been delegated by the
Constitution.
Executive powers had been usurped.
The salaries of the judges, which
the Constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally varied;
and cases belonging to the judiciary department, frequently drawn within
legislative cognizance and determination.
Those who wish to see the several
particulars falling under each of these heads may consult the journals of the
council which are in print. Some of them, it will be found, may be imputable to
peculiar circumstances connected with the war; but the greater part of them may
be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted government.
It appears, also, that the executive
department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the Constitution.
There are three observations, however, which ought to be made on this head: first,
a great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the
necessities of the war, or recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief; second,
in most of the other instances they conformed either to the declared or the
known sentiments of the legislative department; third, the executive
department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States by
the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity to
a legislative assembly as to an executive council. And being at once exempt
from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body,
and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized
measures would, of course, be more freely hazarded, than where the executive
department is administered by a single hand, or by a few hands.
The conclusion which I am warranted
in drawing from these observations is that a mere demarcation on parchment of
the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard
against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the
powers of government in the same hands.
The
Federalist No. 51
The
Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between
the Different Departments
Independent
Journal
Wednesday, February 6, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.
PUBLIUS
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
Election binge
We aren’t going to talk about specifically
about elections for a few units, but how can we not take a look at the recent election given the start time of our course. While Connecticut actually had a white-hot election that garnered lots of
national media attention – Murphy versus McMahon - which was much like the McMahon/Blumenthal race in 2010, but the Nutmeg State certainly wasn't alone in terms of big races.
First, read Ken Rudin’s article written before
the election. Mr. Rudin is an expert
political commentator for National Public Radio and he has predicted the “races
to watch” for political junkies like ourselves.
Read the above article. Why do you think so many House races are in play for this
election? What effect is the retirement of senior congressmen going to
have according to Rudin? Does Rudin make a clear cut prediction of
eventual winners?
Now, take a look at the platforms of the two
presidential candidates in 2012. For fun, lets take a look at the Clinton platform from the 1992 election. Have we change or moved on with the issues?
How did the Obama and Romney platforms
differ? What are the major issues?
What does Clinton’s 1992 Platform focus
on? Does it differ substantially from
the platforms in 2012?
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Courant Article
The Hartford Courant did a great profile of one of our own.
http://www.courant.com/community/manchester/hc-mx-person-of-the-week-1122-20121121,0,6029070.story
Congratulations Sam!
http://www.courant.com/community/manchester/hc-mx-person-of-the-week-1122-20121121,0,6029070.story
Congratulations Sam!
Monday, November 19, 2012
HW and Test
Part 1: Federalist No. 10, James Madison (attached) – Please complete for 11/26
Read Federalist No. 10 and then answer the following questions. Please complete each response in a paragraph
or two.
·
What is a
faction? Why are factions a problem in government? What are the two
methods for curing the mischiefs of faction?
What are the two methods for removing the causes of faction?
·
To what
extent will enlightened leadership solve the problems of factions? Why
does Madison put more trust in the leaders than the people?
·
Why does a
republic do a better job of controlling the effects of faction than a pure
democracy? Why does a large republic do a better job of controlling the
effects of faction than a small republic?
·
If you were
an anti-federalist, what are some arguments that you might make against Federalist 10?
Part 2: Excerpts from Democracy in America, Alexis de
Tocqueville (attached) – Please complete for 11/28
Read the excerpts from Democracy in America and then answer the
following questions. Please complete
each response in a paragraph or two.
·
What does
Tocqueville mean when says that “everyone is the best and sole judge of his own
private and that society has no right to control a man's actions unless they
are prejudicial to the common welfare”?
What do you think the term common welfare means?
·
What is the
“Spirit of New England” and what values does that represent?
·
What does
Tocqueville mean by the term “Centralization”?
What are its pros and cons?
Test: Response Paper – Due
on 11/30
You should prepare a paper in
which you answer the questions below having read both of the above
sources. You should use evidence from
each of these documents to justify your answers (because it is good practice
and sound writing). Your paper should be
2-3 pages. When citing from the
documents, please use your MHS Style
Guide for guidelines and help. Feel
free to include additional articles or resources to help you to prepare your
paper.
Questions for paper assignment –
1.
What is
Madison’s view of human nature? Does he think human beings are essentially good
or bad? How does his answer to this question influence his approach to
government?
2.
Is Madison
arguing in favor of majority rule or against it? Does he trust the masses to
make enlightened choices or not? How does his answer to this question influence
his approach to government?
3.
There was
much debate about whether the United States need a strong federal government
(federalists) or strong local governments and autonomy (anti-federalists). Do you think Tocqueville would be a
federalist or anti-federalist? Why?
4.
This debate
about the role, power and authority that the federal government should have
continues today. What contemporary
political issues demonstrate this tension?
Why?
Thursday, November 15, 2012
Welcome to the Class of 2013
Hi everyone! Welcome to your AP Government course. We've got lots of fun in store, especially in the wake of the current election, and we're going to start off the class with a discussion of the Obama/Romney fight for the White House.
Take a look at the following resources:
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/about.html
http://www.c-spanclassroom.org/pdf/2012_electoral_map.pdf
http://uselectionatlas.org/INFORMATION/INFORMATION/electcollege_procon.php
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/us/politics/how-the-party-platforms-differ.html
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/11/15/mitt-romney-says-obama-won-by-giving-gifts-to-immigrant-voters/
Questions for HW:
1. First and foremost, what is the Electoral College (EC) and why was it established? How are the total number of EC votes in a state allocated?
2. Looking at the C-SPAN map, what states have seen the biggest gains in the EC? Which ones have seen the losses? Why?
3. Summarize the pros and cons of the EC. Should the EC be maintained or abolished? Why?
4. Look at the NY Times article regarding how the two party platforms differ - what are some of the major differences between the two parties? Do you perceive one as being more closely aligned with your own political ethos?
5. Lastly, read the Fox News article regarding comments on Wednesday from former Governor Romney about how President Obama won the election. What is your reaction? How does this statement correspond to what you learned about the two platforms?
** Please write or type your answers and bring them to class on Tuesday! Thanks! **
My e-mail address is b11rjone@manchesterct.gov. Feel free to e-mail anytime with questions, comments, concerns, etc.
I'm looking forward to a wonderful semester with all of you! Mr. Jones :)
Take a look at the following resources:
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/about.html
http://www.c-spanclassroom.org/pdf/2012_electoral_map.pdf
http://uselectionatlas.org/INFORMATION/INFORMATION/electcollege_procon.php
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/us/politics/how-the-party-platforms-differ.html
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/11/15/mitt-romney-says-obama-won-by-giving-gifts-to-immigrant-voters/
Questions for HW:
1. First and foremost, what is the Electoral College (EC) and why was it established? How are the total number of EC votes in a state allocated?
2. Looking at the C-SPAN map, what states have seen the biggest gains in the EC? Which ones have seen the losses? Why?
3. Summarize the pros and cons of the EC. Should the EC be maintained or abolished? Why?
4. Look at the NY Times article regarding how the two party platforms differ - what are some of the major differences between the two parties? Do you perceive one as being more closely aligned with your own political ethos?
5. Lastly, read the Fox News article regarding comments on Wednesday from former Governor Romney about how President Obama won the election. What is your reaction? How does this statement correspond to what you learned about the two platforms?
** Please write or type your answers and bring them to class on Tuesday! Thanks! **
My e-mail address is b11rjone@manchesterct.gov. Feel free to e-mail anytime with questions, comments, concerns, etc.
I'm looking forward to a wonderful semester with all of you! Mr. Jones :)
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
The Long Pause
After many, many months of waiting, hoping and wondering, it appears as though Blogger is finally off of the blocked website list here at MHS. Huzzah! This is great news because I'll be posting and reposting information for you in advance of the AP exam for your review and study.
Reminders:
1. If you haven't already registered, you need to see Ms. Cratty to pay for your exam ASAP. It's a requirement of the class.
2. Please pick up a review manual to help you with your own study. Many of the kids last year used The Princeton Review: Cracking the AP Test edition, but it's definitely a personal preference and any of them should do a fine job with helping you to prepare.
3. Budget Assignments are due before the break!
4. The terms are still due if you haven't finished them.
We'll have some review sessions starting up in April. I'll have more information for you after the break.
Thanks, Mr. Jones
Reminders:
1. If you haven't already registered, you need to see Ms. Cratty to pay for your exam ASAP. It's a requirement of the class.
2. Please pick up a review manual to help you with your own study. Many of the kids last year used The Princeton Review: Cracking the AP Test edition, but it's definitely a personal preference and any of them should do a fine job with helping you to prepare.
3. Budget Assignments are due before the break!
4. The terms are still due if you haven't finished them.
We'll have some review sessions starting up in April. I'll have more information for you after the break.
Thanks, Mr. Jones
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